Leveraged Finance Asset Allocation Insights: An Eventual Tailwind for High Yield?

Steven Oh, CFA
Global Head of Credit and Fixed Income, Co-Head of Leveraged Finance

Prices of high yield bonds and bank loans came under pressure again in May. Volatility spiked and spread-widening accelerated as investors grew increasingly concerned that Federal Reserve tightening will choke growth and lead to recession. Consumer-related areas of the leveraged finance market were particularly affected. Squeezed by higher prices for gasoline and food, households are focusing on essentials and shifting demand away from goods and toward services.
Earnings have been mixed, with some issuers missing estimates and lowering 2022 guidance. Still, defaults remain limited. We acknowledge that defaults are likely to increase, but any rise will start from historically low levels. While fundamentals have deteriorated from a starting base of highly supportive conditions, valuations now compensate investors much better for the less favorable conditions. Spreads are trading at levels not seen since mid- to late-2020. While stubbornly high inflation and hawkish Fed policy continue to weigh on future economic growth prospects, we view the move in Treasury rates and credit spreads as making all-in yields attractive.
From a total return standpoint, the bank loan and high yield asset classes declined by a similar amount in May. However, given the year-to-date moves in Treasury rates and the relative outperformance of loans vis-à-vis high yield, the weighted average price in the high yield market is about five points below that of the loan market.1 While we see the potential for high yield to continue to widen and overshoot on the downside, we believe this differential in terms of the average discount to par will eventually provide a tailwind.
Conviction Score (CS) and Investment Views
The following sections reflect the investment team’s views on the relative attractiveness of the various segments of below-investment-grade corporate credit. Conviction scores are assigned on a scale from 1 to 5, with 1 being the highest conviction.
US Leveraged Loans
Kevin Wolfson Portfolio Manager, US Leveraged Loans
CS 3.0 (+0.3)
Fundamentals: For US loan issuers, fundamentals remain largely positive amid greater macro uncertainty. Most first-quarter earnings reported thus far have shown gains, but growth seems less broad-based than in previous quarters. Increased volatility in earnings is expected as issuers continue to face inflationary pressures affecting input and labor costs. Rising interest rates could become an issue for those credits with mostly floating-rate debt and limited free cash flow. While default rates (0.18% as of 30 April 2022) remain near all-time lows (0.15% as of June 2007), the number of stressed credits has increased, and the default rate is expected to rise in the near term.2
Valuations: The spread-to-maturity for the broad S&P/LSTA index widened roughly 61 basis points (bps) to L+466 between 18 April 2022 and 17 May 2022. The weighted-average bid for the market declined roughly 275 bps over the same period.³ New-issue spreads are coming at the wider end of price talk, and although spreads have widened over the last month, valuations seem fair given the increased market volatility. In the near term, sentiment and declining liquidity seem to be overwhelming technical and fundamental factors.
Technicals: Demand for loans has waned recently as new collateralized loan obligation (CLO) formation slowed and retail fund flows turned negative. On the supply side, issuance has slowed as well. Loan issuance through 12 May is on pace to make the second quarter the slowest since late 2020. The forward calendar remains light, and a large portion consists of a handful of transactions.
US High Yield
John Yovanovic, CFA Head of High Yield Portfolio Management
CS 3.0 (unchanged)
Fundamentals: We are bracing for earnings revisions after seeing notable weakness in financials, health care, utilities, and restaurants. Results are tracking trends in consumer strength/ sentiment (resulting in increased provisions for credit losses in financials), labor (resulting in margin pressure from staffing costs in health care and restaurants), and inflation (seen in rising energy costs for power generation and for food). Financial metrics remain solid, with leverage trending back to longer-term averages. We expect default rates to remain low in 2022, although risks may rise given tighter financial conditions and a volatile macro backdrop.
Valuations: While most of the rates move has been priced in, tightening financial conditions and high inflation continue to weigh on risk sentiment. Poor equity performance led to option-adjusted spreads (OAS) on the Bloomberg US Corporate High Yield Bond Index bleeding out to the mid-400s in mid-May. Fair-value OAS should be about 350 bps due to solid fundamentals and our 2% default rate forecast. We see value at 400 OAS despite few upside catalysts given the global macro backdrop. BAML said it best with “buy at 450 but prepare for 500+.”4 The market’s implied default rate is in the 4% area, and we calculate that attractive, high-single-digit next-12-month returns are coming. But it’s going to take equity stability and more clarity on how tight financial conditions must become for us to get there.
Technicals: April’s outflow was $5.9 billion, and outflows continued in May. Outflows year-to-date (YTD) for high yield (HY) now total $33.8 billion, with $15.3 billion coming out of exchange-traded funds (ETFs). The primary market, at just $57.4 billion YTD, continues to be very light. YTD issuance is down 74% from the $221.8 billion issued for the comparable 2021 period. Technicals continue to gap both ways but are negative on balance due to tightening financial conditions and negative equity prices. (Technicals based on JP Morgan data as of 13 May 2022.)
US CLO Tranches
Laila Kollmorgen, CFA Portfolio Manager, CLO Tranche
CS 2.8 (-0.7)
Fundamentals: Credit risks remain benign for US leveraged loans as loan default rates in the US stayed at 0.2%. Fundamentals for CLOs remain constructive despite market turbulence. Loans priced below 80 increased to 1.6% from 1.5% last month but remain well below the five-year average of 3.5%. Despite the sell-off in May and the projected increase in the US loan default rate to 1.0% and in HY to 0.7%, default rates should remain below historical averages in 2022. (Fundamentals based on S&P/LCD data as of 16 May 2022.)
Valuations: BBBs are at 400 to 700, BBs at 750 to 950, and single-Bs at 1,050 to 1,450. BBB rated CLOs are fair to cheap compared to HY OAS at 455 and BB rated leveraged loans at 390. BB rated CLOs are trading wide of single-B HY at 495 and leveraged loans at 565 on an OAS basis. The three-month cross-currency Japan yen/US dollar basis (now using three-month SOFR rather than three-month Libor5) is approximately -34 bps as of 18 May 2022, up about 3 bps over the month, where US dollar assets remain relatively expensive to hedge for Japanese investors. (Valuations based on JP Morgan and S&P/LCD data as of 16 May 2022.)
Technicals: Selling of investment-grade (IG) CLOs has remained elevated the past few weeks, as tracked by bids wanted in competition (BWIC) and the Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE). When combined with a concerted push to price primary deals, the forward pipeline has declined amid volatile markets. We anticipate lower BWIC and primary volumes for the next few months until markets stabilize and spreads tighten. Because of the cheapness of CLO tranches relative to other credit across the capital stack, we anticipate an increase in investor bids in the secondary market.
European Leveraged Loans
Evangeline Lim Portfolio Manager, European Leveraged Finance
CS 3.7 (+0.6)
Fundamentals: Recession in Europe this year, starting with the UK, is looking more likely. For now, the eurozone economy continues to be buoyed by demand recovery from fewer Covid restrictions. The crunch time is likely to come in the fourth quarter. So far, first-quarter earnings have been mixed, with inflation having a pronounced effect on consumer durables and the food and beverage sectors. Sufficient liquidity should keep default rates relatively low for the remainder of the year.
Valuations: The market appears to be constantly repricing credit risk in a volatile environment for risk assets. The general sentiment is increasingly negative, pointing to expectations of wider credit spreads.
Technicals: Loans have continuously drifted lower on low volumes. With widening CLO liabilities, most CLO rampers are mainly looking to the primary market for appropriately priced assets; hence the lack of support in the secondary market despite low loan issuance. So far there are no signs of forced selling from separately managed accounts or CLOs. Prices seem to be drifting lower on the back of certain dealers leaking inventory into the market.
European High Yield
Evangeline Lim Portfolio Manager, European Leveraged Finance
CS 3.6 (+0.1)
Fundamentals: Recession in Europe this year, starting with the UK, is looking more likely. For now, the eurozone economy continues to be buoyed by demand recovery from fewer Covid restrictions. The crunch time is likely to come in the fourth quarter. So far, first-quarter earnings have been mixed, with inflation having a pronounced effect on consumer durables and the food and beverage sectors. Sufficient liquidity should keep default rates relatively low for the remainder of the year.
Valuations: European high yield spreads are wider than for European loans and US high yield, especially in the BB rated space. The wider spreads seem to be justified by the perceived heightening of geopolitical tensions in Europe, which faces challenges in sourcing energy.
Technicals: HY investors remain defensively positioned despite the lack of significant outflows over the past two months. Performance of the few recent new issues clearly demonstrates the bifurcation between high-quality issuers with a proven track record and the rest of the HY universe.
European CLO Tranches
Laila Kollmorgen, CFA Portfolio Manager, CLO Tranche
CS 3.1 (-0.9)
Fundamentals: European leveraged loan default rates declined to 0.6% from 0.8%, and the percentage of loans trading below 80 decreased to 0.8% in April from 1.1%.6 That said, the market sell-off in May has increased those percentages given the conflict in Ukraine and China’s zero-Covid policy. The probability of a recession in Europe continues to increase, and we see a commensurate increase in default rates as a result.
Valuations: BBBs are at 475 to 525, BBs at 700 to 900, and single-Bs at 1,100 to 1,300. BBB rated CLOs are cheap relative to BB HY at 375 and leveraged loans, while BB CLOs are cheap relative to European HY at 485 and leveraged loans. European CLOs benefit from a Euribor floor of zero, which adds between 3 bps and 45 bps to the spread of CLOs, depending on the weighted average life. (Valuations data based on JP Morgan and S&P/LCD data as of 16 May 2022.)
Technicals: While market sentiment has improved slightly in Europe, uncertainty given the Ukraine conflict and increased probability of recession still loom. The thin buying base for European mezzanine tranches is proving a headwind for below-IG tranches.
Global Emerging Markets Corporates
Steven Cook Co-Head of Emerging Markets Fixed Income
CS 2.6 (-0.1)
Fundamentals: Our conviction on HY moved slightly higher, in line with IG, given changes in credit trend distribution on the back of first-quarter results. We remain slightly bullish overall given that our total credit trend distribution is still skewed to the positive. Among the 56% of EM companies reporting first-quarter results, revenue was up 15% year-over-year (y/y) and EBITDA was up 20% y/y.7
Valuations: Over the last month, CEMBI BD spreads have widened 44 bps, with HY up 69 bps, underperforming IG, which was up 31 bps.8 The widening has been a broad risk-off move rather than country specific, as the higher-beta segments have generally underperformed, namely Latin America in IG and Asia and Turkey in HY. While spreads have traded more in range with other fixed-income markets over the last month, we still see value opportunities given the sovereign-driven risk events and strong corporate fundamentals and outlook.
Technicals: Our short-term technical outlook is more positive given the continued cash buildup, due to an absence of significant outflows combined with minimal supply. YTD issuance of $130 billion is down 45% y/y, mainly driven by lower HY issuance, down 79% y/y. YTD net issuance is down $58 billion and could go lower given May’s month-to-date issuance of $5 billion versus $34 billion of scheduled cash inflows. (Technicals based on JP Morgan data as of 16 May 2022.)
1 As of 17 May 2022. High yield: Bloomberg based on Bloomberg US Corporate High Yield Bond Index; Leveraged loans: S&P/LCD based on S&P/LSTA Leveraged Loan Index. 2 S&P/LSTA as of 17 May 2022. 3 S&P/LSTA as of 17 May 2022. 4 BofA Global Research, “High Yield Strategy,” as of 13 May 2022. 5Libor references above should be considered illustrative, as this rate effectively ceased at the end of 2021. Please review “Risks Related to the Discontinuance of the London Interbank Offered Rate (“Libor”)” found at the end of this presentation for more information regarding this transition. 6 S&P/LCD, based on the S&P/LSTA European Leveraged Loan Index, as of 16 May 2022. 7 JP Morgan, as of 18 May 2022. 8 JP Morgan, as of 17 May 2022.
Risks Related to the Discontinuance of the London Interbank Offered Rate (“Libor”)
Libor an estimate of the rate at which a sub-set of banks (known as the panel banks) could borrow money on an uncollateralized basis from other banks. The United Kingdom (the “UK”)’s Financial Conduct Authority (the “FCA”), which regulates Libor, has announced that it will not compel banks to contribute to Libor after 2021; the panel banks will still be required to submit the USD 1-month, 3-month, 6-month and 12-month Libor settings until 30 June 2023. As that date approaches the FCA could decide to require the continued publication of these settings on a synthetic basis, which would represent an approximation of each setting, in order to reduce disruption in the market. On 3 April 2018, the New York Federal Reserve Bank began publishing its alternative rate, the Secured Overnight Financing Rate (“SOFR”). The Bank of England followed suit on 23 April 2018 by publishing its proposed alternative rate, the Sterling Overnight Index Average (“SONIA”). Each of SOFR and SONIA significantly differ from Libor, both in the actual rate and how it is calculated, and therefore it is unclear whether and when markets will adopt either of these rates as a widely accepted replacement for Libor. If no widely accepted conventions develop, it is uncertain what effect broadly divergent interest rate calculation methodologies in the markets will have on the price and liquidity of loans and debt obligations held by the funds, securities issued by the funds and our ability to effectively mitigate interest rate risks.
The Alternative Reference Rate Committee confirmed that the 5 March 2021 announcements by the ICE Benchmark Administration Limited and the FCA on the future cessation and loss of the representativeness of the Libor benchmark rates constitutes a “benchmark transition event” with respect to all U.S. dollar Libor settings. A “benchmark transition event” may cause, or allow for, certain contracts to replace Libor with an alternative reference rate and such replacement could have a material and adverse effect on Libor-linked financial instruments.
As of the date of this presentation, no specific alternative rates have been selected in the market, although the Alternative Reference Rates Committee convened by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System has made recommendations regarding a specified alternative rate based on a priority waterfall of alternative rates and certain bank regulators and the SEC are encouraging the adoption of such specified alternative rate. It is uncertain whether or for how long Libor will continue to be viewed as an acceptable market benchmark, what rate or rates could become accepted alternatives to Libor, or what the effect any such changes could have on the financial markets for Libor-linked financial instruments. Similar statements have been made by regulators with respect to the other Inter-Bank Offered Rates (“IBORs”). Certain products / strategies can undertake transactions in instruments that are valued using Libor or other IBOR rates or enter into contracts which determine payment obligations by reference to Libor or one of the other IBORs. Until their discontinuance, the products / strategies could continue to invest in instruments that reference Libor or the other IBORs. In advance of 2021, regulators and market participants are working to develop successor rates and transition mechanisms to amend existing instruments and contracts to replace an IBOR with a new rate. Nonetheless, the termination of Libor and the other IBORs presents risks to product / strategies investing in Libor-linked financial instruments. It is not possible at this point to identify those risks exhaustively, but they include the risk that an acceptable transition mechanism might not be found or might not be suitable for those products / strategies (as applicable). In addition, any alternative reference rate and any pricing adjustments required in connection with the transition from Libor or another IBOR could impose costs on, or might not be suitable for applicable products / strategies, resulting in costs incurred to close out positions and enter into replacement trades.
Disclosure
Investing involves risk, including possible loss of principal. The information presented herein is for illustrative purposes only and should not be considered reflective of any particular security, strategy, or investment product. It represents a general assessment of the markets at a specific time and is not a guarantee of future performance results or market movement. This material does not constitute investment, financial, legal, tax, or other advice; investment research or a product of any research department; an offer to sell, or the solicitation of an offer to purchase any security or interest in a fund; or a recommendation for any investment product or strategy. PineBridge Investments is not soliciting or recommending any action based on information in this document. Any opinions, projections, or forward-looking statements expressed herein are solely those of the author, may differ from the views or opinions expressed by other areas of PineBridge Investments, and are only for general informational purposes as of the date indicated. Views may be based on third-party data that has not been independently verified. PineBridge Investments does not approve of or endorse any republication of this material. You are solely responsible for deciding whether any investment product or strategy is appropriate for you based upon your investment goals, financial situation and tolerance for risk.