2026 Multi-Asset Outlook: Back to Micro
Michael J. Kelly, CFA
Global Head of Multi-Asset
Hani Redha, CAIA
Portfolio Manager, Head of Strategy and Research for Global Multi-Asset
Teresa Wang
Vice President, Research Analyst, Global Multi-Asset
Market leadership may well return to the US in 2026, and if so, many investors could find themselves offsides. While post-Covid US-centricity was driven by US fiscal stimulus at a time when other governments were sitting still, the market pivot that lies ahead will be driven by the private sector. Think micro, not macro.
While it makes sense to look for parallels to the late-1990s internet bubble amid today’s AI exuberance, we see more differences than similarities. That investment wave was narrow and rested on unprofitable cash-burning business models; the AI buildout is seen to be driven by highly profitable companies.
Watch for big growth in blockchain infrastructure, electricity, and continued reshoring as well. The introduction and adoption of game-changing technologies takes time, leading to long periods of stepped-up productivity, disrupted labor forces, and profitability for the few – which, in our view, leads both to narrow economics and markets, as well as extended periods in which stock indices perform well above average. They are not always as favorable for the bonds that finance them. As such, investors should consider diversifying their diversifiers.
Many believe the economy will slow throughout 2026, with inflation remaining stuck near 3% and a deflating AI bubble keeping US markets lagging others throughout 2026. A bit too much extrapolation, perhaps? We are optimistic that US markets will likely resume their leadership positions in 2026, particularly as AI investment continues.
We’re exiting a year that was marked by unusual catalysts outside the US: The grand entrance of DeepSeek, Germany’s removal of its debt brake, and Taiwan life insurers getting caught offsides by US dollar strength with inadequate foreign exchange (FX) hedges – a meaningful driver of the US Dollar Index’s 10% decline by midyear and providing an extra bounce in non-US market returns.
Unexpected US fiscal contraction showed up in the second half given timing issues within the One Big Beautiful Bill Act (OBBBA) paired with revenue-raising tariffs. The year ended with a US government shutdown which created an inability to spend that collided with the quarterly Treasury issuance calendar. Quantitative tightening also progressed to the point that it breached “ample liquidity” for several months before the program was shut down. Taken together, these events drained liquidity. While US markets lagged somewhat in 2025, US earnings outperformed; we head into 2026 expecting most US markets to resume their leadership positions, including stocks and the dollar, though not the longer end of the bond market.
AI to spur a new era of growth
We believe that in certain historical periods, a new technology drives a long stretch of above-average, productivity-driven, non-inflationary growth. Job markets are often dislocated as the emergence of new professions lags the interim rise in earnings and stocks with extended above-average returns. Term premiums also rise (a bad thing for long bonds) given heavy investment demands. Despite bubble fears, our work suggests that we are still relatively early into such a period.
Instead of slowing, we see growth reaccelerating – particularly in the US, as the AI-driven investment cycle extends through 2026 and beyond, with today’s liquidity disruptions normalizing early in the new year to the benefit of markets. US fiscal policy should flip early on from contractionary to stimulative (given the timing of policies within the OBBBA). It’s also a midterm election year, which has taught markets to expect more stimulus. We wouldn’t be surprised to see a compromise on the Affordable Care Act (ACA) subsidies (e.g., a one-year extension for reform measures), as well as a summertime bill passed through reconciliation, with affordability legislation, like tariff rebate checks, seriously considered.
China also is attempting to reboot, with more government infrastructure spending teamed with more “anti-involution” reforms (aimed primarily at stopping local governments from overinvesting, yet targeting corporate overinvestment as well). Such reform periods, which tend to last about two years, are often teamed with offsetting liquidity injections. In 2015-2016, to offset supply-side reductions in “old industry,” policy banks infused liquidity into real estate. This time acceleration of the PBOC’s balance sheet is being channeled into the stock market.
From the US stock market perspective, this setup looks more like the mid-1990s than 2000. The internet bubble burst in early 2000 from impatience: they “built it,” but the payoffs “did not come” – at least not soon enough. The true killer apps of social media arrived much later, with Facebook in 2004 and the iPhone in 2007.
If AI does turn out to be a bubble (not our view), the cause will likely also be ineffective or delayed applications, rather than today’s concerns over valuations versus current metrics or over-investment by the hyperscalers. While hyperscalers do view AI dominance as existential, we are witnessing market angst over their ever-accelerating capex as a welcome form of market discipline, capable of pushing companies to better align their plans with revenue take-up. Meanwhile, after their ratcheting of capex, the hyperscalers are still expected to deliver free cash flow exceeding their announced capital spending or debt issuance for the 2026-2028 period.
A ‘micro’-driven pivot back to the US
One commonality between the mid- to late-1990s and today is global investors’ desire to access the world’s major growth driver. Back then it was the internet, which was US-centric. Now it’s AI, and soon blockchain as well. While China is expected to dominate AI once we reach the humanoid robot stage, that is still years away; today, it’s AI training, inference, and agentics waves, where in our view the US looks poised to lead.
During the internet buildout, investments had to flow to the US to access the early internet beneficiaries, and we suspect this will be true with AI as well, with flows leading to a strong NASDAQ and US dollar in 2026. In the 90s, these flows occurred despite falling rates as stepped-up productivity-driven growth cohabitated with disinflation.
Essentially, what we expect to see next year is a new version of what many had called US exceptionalism before 2025 – this time driven by micro effects, not macro policy. Post-Covid, that spell of US exceptionalism was driven predominantly by a macro dose of US fiscal activism, which spurred consumption and investment at a time when other countries were sitting still, fiscally speaking. This micro version implies that green shoots in 2026 will emerge predominantly in the US, pulling investors around the world into investment opportunities for which they will first need to purchase US dollars. Given a growing inclination to penalize over-investors in the infrastructure buildout, these opportunities will most likely be found among users of AI or within the installed software bases that enable breakthroughs.
While markets easily accommodated post-Covid US fiscal activism due to a lack of private sector investment, the global setup today is dramatically different. Private sector investment in the US is becoming quite vibrant, driven by AI and all the electricity it will require. Japan’s and Europe’s governments are much more interested in investment, yet their private sectors – facing trade issues both from US tariffs and China’s competitive threat – are not overly strong. In bond markets, we expect the degree of steepening in term premia to begin reflecting these country-specific borrowing appetites, despite the US Treasury’s intent to shift issuance to the short end to accommodate the uptake of US-dollar-based stablecoin.
China stands out, with private sector investment coming down sharply, along with consumption, except at the very upper end (with a K-shaped pattern appearing there as in the US). The declines in China’s private sector investment appear to be due, at least in part, to the government’s new anti-involution policies, which aim to curb over-investment (in sync with the local governments, where such policies are primarily aimed). The only investment appetite in town is seemingly for more central-government-driven infrastructure.
2026 Asset Allocation Views
Equities: Broadening?
We foresee a continuation of US equity market leadership, especially in AI-related sectors, as well as their users. We’re less convinced of the consensus call that looks for a broadening. Likely beneficiaries are data-rich industries and companies aggressively pursuing AI. At present, larger firms are pursuing AI more vigorously. Broadening-out rallies are also typically an early-cycle phenomenon. Periods of great change and innovation create meaningful winners and losers, which is not the proverbial tide that lifts all boats, and not an environment where broadening of leadership takes place.
While we’re conscious of the risks of superscalers and others overinvesting in AI infrastructure, we don’t think these risks will manifest in 2026 given the market discipline now setting in. We nonetheless have begun to focus more on applications that we expect to be the first beneficiaries of AI datacenter and model buildouts (and even more so if overbuilding ensues). Those will be fleet-footed opportunistic adapters – not necessarily big or small, or from any particular geography.
Fixed income: going global
While global developed market (DM) sovereigns have become more fiscally active, a positive differentiator is those whose private sectors are less vibrant with respect to issuing debt. We continue to find DM sovereign maturities of over 10 years less attractive, as well as corporate debt for which the years ahead appear heavy on long-term debt issuance, not only for AI, but also for the stepped-up electricity demands.
Given stable fundamentals, credit thrives when (and where) business is stable and the appetite to make capital investments is tepid. We see funding pressures emerging at the very long end, particularly in the US, which haven’t been witnessed for decades. Within credit, we continue to favor the belly of the curve and Asian high yield (ex China property), yet we are now also interested in a handful of local currency carry bonds in LatAm, where inflation has dipped below US inflation. We also see patches of relative value in select private versus public markets amid rising rates, with a focus on high-quality tranches within private credit, including infrastructure and asset-backed finance (ABF) markets.
Alternatives: notable diversifiers
Alternatives, especially gold, are important diversifiers amid the erosion of the negative correlation between risk-free bonds and equities, which has diminished the diversification benefits of sovereign bonds. Gold remains one of the few safety assets whose diversification benefits to equity risk have not declined, rendering its value in a portfolio context more valuable. To some, as DM sovereigns’ fiscal deficits to GDP continue to rise and are flirting with unsustainable levels, gold also takes on a protective element against debasement.
We have long been skeptical of crypto’s allure as an alternative, as its use cases disappointed in broadening beyond speculation, with no real utility other than in remaining anonymous. In the year ahead, we expect to see the beginning of a migration by leading financial firms away from legacy-based systems toward blockchain to enable more efficient transactions. For the first time, one will be able to invest in (as opposed to speculate on) the growth of transactions occurring on the blockchain infrastructure.
For more insights into the trends moving markets in the coming year, see our 2026 Investment Outlook.
市場普遍估計2026年的經濟增長放慢，預期通脹維持於接近3%，且人工智能泡沫消退，今年美國市場料將繼續落後於其他地區。不過這也許過於悲觀，我們反而看好美國將於2026年再次主導市場，尤其是人工智能投資熱潮方興未艾，對美國更有利。
去年，在美國以外的地區，多項特殊因素對市場造成了影響。DeepSeek隆重登場、德國取消「債務煞車」限制，及台灣人壽保險商因美元升值及外匯對沖不足而陷入被動，構成美元指數在年中下跌10%的主因，並帶動非美國市場回報反彈。
去年下半年，美國實施增加收入的關稅政策，但因選錯時間推行「大而美法案」，最終陷入意料之外的財政緊縮困局。至去年年底，美國政府被迫停擺，公共支出受阻，此時正好遇上每季發行國庫債券的時間。另外，在量化緊縮計劃結束前的多月，市場資金亦低於「流動性充裕」的標準。整體來看，上述事件均導致流動性枯竭。儘管2025年美國市場表現稍遜，企業盈利仍超乎預期；展望2026年，我們預期多數美國市場將重拾領先地位，涵蓋股票與美元，惟長年期債券市場除外。
人工智能開啟增長新時代
在某些特定歷史時期，新技術的面世可以提高生產力，帶來超越平均的長期增長，而且不會推高通脹。當企業的盈利及股價短暫上升，回報持續跑贏平均水平時，新的崗位未能及時出現，往往導致就業市場失衡。龐大的投資需求亦會推高期限溢價，不利長債表現。幸好，儘管市場擔憂泡沫風險，我們的研究顯示目前仍屬價格泡沫的早期階段。
我們預期增長將加速而非放緩—尤其在美國，因人工智能投資週期料於2026年及往後延續，現而有的流動性問題應於年初恢復正常，支持市場表現。按照「大而美法案」的政策時間表，年初美國將結束緊縮的財政政策，轉為推行刺激措施。該國也將於今年舉行中期大選，市場期望當局的刺激措施加碼。我們不排除政府就《平價醫療法案》的補貼安排作出讓步，例如將改革措施延長一年，或在夏季透過協調程序通過法案，包括認真考慮減輕民眾負擔的安排，例如發放關稅退稅支票。
另一方面，中國亦嘗試推動經濟重啟，包括增加政府基建投資，並開展更多「反內卷」改革行動，主要針對地方政府及企業的過度投資問題。有關改革一般持續約兩年，通常配合流動性注入措施，以抵銷負面影響。舉例來說，於2015年至2016年，政策性銀行為了減輕傳統行業供應收縮帶來的衝擊，於是向房地產市場注入流動資金，而在目前的調整中，中國人民銀行加快擴大資產負債表，資金主要流向股票市場。
從美國股市的角度來看，眼前的情況較接近1990年代中期，多於2000年。於2000年初，投資者急於求成，是互聯網泡沫爆破的原因。當時，企業已經「建立」平台，而回報卻「不見蹤影」，至少未有如投資者預期般迅速出現。一直要到多年之後，真正的突破性社交媒體應用才告登場，例子包括2004年推出的Facebook及2007年面世的iPhone。
假如市場發展不像我們預期，人工智能浪潮最終成為泡沫，原因很可能在於應用成效不彰或延遲，而非當今市場對估值與現行指標的擔憂，抑或超大規模企業的過度投資。超大型企業將人工智能優勢視作生死攸關的問題，惟該類公司的資本支出加快增長，引起了投資者的憂慮。好消息是，市場將形成正面的約束作用，促使企業配合收入調整計劃。同時，即使超大型企業的資本支出持續增加，於2026年至2028年間，預期他們的自由現金流依然可以超越先前公布的資本支出或發債規模。
「微觀因素」帶領美國重掌主導地位
1990年代中後期與目前的共通點之一，是全球投資者均渴望參與世界主要增長引擎。當年市場的增長源頭是以美國為首的互聯網發展趨勢，而現在的成長動力則來自人工智能技術及將要崛起的區塊鏈浪潮。儘管預期中國將在類人機器人階段主導人工智能領域，但該階段尚需數年才能實現；當前處於人工智訓練、推理與智能體技術的浪潮階段，我們認為美國在此領域已蓄勢待發。
在互聯網發展初期，投資者必須將資金投向美國，才可以從最早受惠的企業中分一杯羹。我們估計人工智能投資也不例外，於2026年流入的資金將支持納斯達克指數及美元的強勁表現。於90年代，雖然利率下跌，但生產力改善促進企業增長，加上通脹放緩，吸引資金不斷流入。
事實上，2025年前大家口中的美國例外主義，預期將於今年以新的方式捲土重來，這次將由微觀效應驅動，而非宏觀政策所主導。在疫情過後，美國主動推出大量財政政策，造就了美國例外主義的光環。該等措施有助刺激消費及投資，反觀其他國家卻維持著原有的財政政策。現在，新版本的美國例外主義將由微觀因素主導，意味著2026年的市場復甦將集中於美國。全球投資者需要先買入美元，才可以把握投資機遇。由於市場對過度投入基建的企業日益不利，上述投資機會最有機會出現於使用人工智能的公司，或擁有用戶基礎並具突破潛力的軟件商。
疫情後時期，私人市場投資不足，美國主動推行的財政措施大受市場歡迎。然而，當前的全球格局已大為不同。受到人工智能發展及相關電力需求所吸引，美國的私人市場投資變得活躍。此外，日本及歐洲政府亦有意作出投資，只是面對美國關稅及中國競爭威脅造成的貿易挑戰，當地的私人市場投資興趣不大。在債券市場方面，美國財政部打算將發債重心轉向短期債券，以配合美元穩定幣的應用。縱然如此，我們預期期限溢價的陡峭程度將開始反映各國的借貸需求。
有別於其他國家，中國的私人市場投資及消費大幅下降，只有極高端消費維持向好，與美國一樣呈現K型結構。中國的私人市場投資減少，原因之一是政府新推出的反內卷政策，其主要針對地方政府而設，旨在配合有關單位抑制過度投資。換句話說，此刻市場唯一願意投入資金的方向，似乎只有中央政府主導的基建項目。
2026年資產配置觀點
股票：升勢擴大？
我們預期美國股市將持續領跑，特別是人工智慧相關領域及其應用企業。對於市場普遍預期的擴張性走勢，我們持保留態度。真正受益者應是數據密集型產業及積極投入人工智慧的企業，而目前看來，大型企業較積極地支持人工智能發展。在經濟周期之初，市場升勢擴大是常見情況。然而，重大的變革及創新往往造就明顯的輸家與贏家，並非俗語所說「水漲船高、人人受惠」的局面，也不會使市場領導地位擴散到更多企業。
儘管超大規模數據中心及其他企業或會過分投資於人工智能基建，在現有的市場約束力量下，我們認為該類風險不會於2026年產生影響。話雖如此，我們已開始圍繞人工智能數據中心及模型發展，將更多注意力放在預期最先受惠的應用上。如果後續出現過度建設的情況，我們將加倍留意相關公司。這些企業通常反應迅速、善於把握機會，並且可以靈活適應情況。他們的規模不定，可以來自任何地區。
固定收益：全球視野
儘管全球已發展市場主權國家的財政活動日益活躍，但箇中主要的分別在於私營企業發行債務較不活躍的國家。我們依然認為，10年以上已發展市場主權債券的吸引力較低，企業債務亦然—未來數年長期債務發行量可能偏高，不僅為了人工智慧，亦因應電力需求的逐步攀升。
在基本因素穩健的情況下，如果企業經營狀況良好，而且資本投資意願不高，其信貸資產往往有良好表現。我們觀察到，長債市場現正面臨數十年未見的融資壓力，當中以美國債券最為明顯。一眾信貸資產中，我們繼續看好中期債券及亞洲高收益債券（不包括中國房地產）。不過，我們也留意拉丁美洲的少數本地貨幣息差債券，當地的通脹率有所下降，現正低於美國水平。在持續加息的環境下，個別私人市場較公開市場更有價值。我們特別專注於優質的私募信貸資產，包括基建及資產抵押融資市場。
另類資產：值得關注的分散投資工具
隨著無風險債券與股票之間的負相關性減弱，主權債券的資金分散優勢下降，另類資產成為了重要的多元化投資工具。黃金仍是少數未見分散效益衰退的安全資產，使其在投資組合中的價值更顯珍貴。對部分投資者而言，已發展市場主權國家的財政赤字佔本地生產總值比例不斷上升，甚至接近不可持續的水平，因此黃金也具備對抗貨幣貶值的保護功能。
我們長期以來對加密貨幣作為替代方案的吸引力持懷疑態度，因其應用場景未能突破投機範疇，除匿名性外缺乏實質用途。未來一年，主要金融機構料將開始從傳統系統過渡至區塊鏈，以提高交易效率。屆時，我們將可真正投資於區塊鏈基建上的交易增長機遇，不再只是投機買賣。
如欲了解新一年市場趨勢的專業分析，請參閱 《2026年投資展望》。
Disclosure
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2026 Investment Outlook
Such Great Heights
